演化倫理學是從演化生物學的觀點來研究人類的道德, 它包含了經驗性的以及哲學性的研究。經驗性的演化倫理學探討道德之演化的起源, 援引來自靈長學、發展心理學、演化生物學等科學所提供的證據。哲學性的演化倫理學則是主張人之演化的事實有助於回答道德哲學當中的許多重要問題, 像是我們應該如何行為以及道德判斷是否獲得證成等等。
經驗性的演化倫理學直到達爾文於1871年發表The Descent of Man一書之後才真正生根萌芽。在廿世紀下半葉, W. Hamilton對於親緣選擇的研究, R. Trivers對於相互利他行為的研究, 再加上E.O. Wilson所提倡的社會生物學, 以及繼起發展的演化心理學則有助於復興經驗性的演化倫理學。這股復興勢力促使許多哲學家專注於演化倫理學, 甚至宣稱把倫理學予以生物學化的時代已經來臨。
哲學性的演化倫理學成功的希望有多高？對此問題的回答取決於它能否成功建立底下三個論題：
(1) 道德乃是生物學上所謂的適應(道德天生的論題)。
(2) 道德天生論有倫理學上的蘊涵(相干性論題)。
(3) 顯示該蘊涵確切為何。(道德獲得證實的論題或是道德基礎瓦解的論題)

Evolutionary ethics is the study of human morality from the perspective of evolutionary biology, which involves empirical as well as philosophical investigation. Empirical evolutionary ethics explores the evolutionary origin of morality, drawing evidence from primatology, developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, and so on. Essential to philosophical evolutionary ethics is the claim that facts about human evolution can help address certain perennial problems in moral philosophy, such as how we ought to act or whether our moral judgments are justified.
Empirical evolutionary ethics hasn’t really taken root until Darwin’s publication of The Descent of Man in 1871. In the course of the second half of 20th century, W. Hamilton’s work on kin selection, R. Trivers’ work on reciprocal altruism, along with the sociobiology advocated by E.O. Wilson, and the evolutionary psychology at its heel, helped to revive empirical evolutionary ethics. Such a revival prompted a number of philosophers to pay attention to evolutionary ethics, and even to claim that the time for ethics to be biologicized has come.
The question of how promising philosophical evolutionary ethics is depends on whether and to what extent it could succeed in:
(1) establishing that morality is a biological adaptation (the thesis of moral nativism);
(2) showing that moral nativism has implications for ethics (the thesis of relevance); and
(3) finding out exactly what significant implications there are (either the vindication thesis or the undermining thesis).