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課程名稱 |
專題研究：德性知識論的最新發展
Independent Study: Recent Work On Virtue Epistemology |
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開課學期 |
110-2 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
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課號 |
Phl8834 |
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課程識別碼 |
124 D2550 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
1.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期五1(8:10~9:00) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室二 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後，始得選課。
限博士班 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限：3人 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
德性知識論自兩大派先驅者Ernest Sosa (1980) 與 Linda Zagzebski (1996) 開創以降，至今已有了更進一步的豐富發展，產生了更多新的研究議題。而本專題課程將研討以下兩個主要極具發展潛力的新領域：「個體知性德性」（individual epistemic virtue）以及「知性德性（epistemic virtue）與理解（understanding）之間的關係」。前者的探討將會涵蓋「知性自律」（epistemic autonomy）、「知性正義」（epistemic justice）、「智性謙遜」（intellectual humility）、「開放心胸」（open-mindedness）與「知性勇氣」（epistemic courage）等重要議題，後者的討論則會從德性知識論的核心理念——以「知性德性」（epistemic virtue）作為知識的基礎——出發，探討要如何以「知性德性」來分析與定義「理解」這項知識論上的重要概念。上述這些議題，都是傳統知識論所忽視的，而本課程將搭乘德性知識論的趨勢，研討與發展這些知識論上重要的新興研究方向。 |
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課程目標 |
本課程目標在於使學生
(1) 完整掌握關於德性知識論的議題；
(2) 掌握德性知識論領域的專業學識與最新學術資訊；
(3) 能針對德性知識論研究領域中的專題與專家提出原創性的批判論述，並發展自己的觀點。 |
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課程要求 |
每週閱讀指定內容，並寫作短文，定期討論。 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Allan Hazlett (2019). Skepticism. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.221-231.
Anne Baril (2019). What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable? In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.69-80.
Anne Meylan (2019). Virtue Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.317-329.
Catherine Z. Elgin (2019). Epistemic Virtues in Understanding. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.330-339.
Duncan Pritchard (2019). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.285-295.
Ernest Sosa (2019). Telic Virtue Epistemology. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.15-25.
Georgi Gardiner (2019). Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.296-308.
Heather Battaly (2019). A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp. 115-126.
Heidi Grasswick (2019). Epistemic Autonomy in a Social World of Knowing. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.196-208.
Ian James Kidd (2019). Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.244-255.
J. Adam Carter (2019). Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.420-432.
James Montmarquet (2019). Do Epistemic Virtues Require a Motivation for Truth? In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.37-46.
Jason Baehr (2019). Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.95-104.
John Greco (2019). Virtue, Knowledge, and Achievement. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.273-284.
John Turri (2019). Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.309-316.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2019). The Epistemic Virtue of Deference. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.209-220.
Lani Watson (2019). Curiosity and Inquisitiveness. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.155-166.
Laura Beeby (2019). Epistemic Justice: Three Models of Virtue. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.232-243.
Linda Zagzebski (2019). Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.26-36.
Matthew Kieran (2019). Creativity as an Epistemic Virtue. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.167-177.
Michael S. Brady (2019). The Role of Emotion in Intellectual Virtue. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.47-57
Michael Slote (2019). Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology: Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.105-114.
Nancy E. Snow (2019). Intellectual Humility. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.178-195.
Nathan King (2019). Intellectual Perseverance. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.256-272.
Reza Lahroodi (2019). Virtue Epistemology and Collective Epistemology. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.407-419.
Robert Audi (2019). Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.352-362.
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood (2019). Understanding, Humility, and the Vices of Pride. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.363-378.
Robert Lockie (2019). Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.81-94.
Stephen R. Grimm (2019). Understanding as an Intellectual Virtue. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.340-351.
Wayne Riggs (2019). Open-Mindedness. In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology. Routledge. pp.141-154. |
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參考書目 |
Anderson, E. (2012) “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions,” Social Epistemology 26(2): 163–173.
Aristotle. (1998) The Nicomachean Ethics, D. Ross (trans.), New York: Oxford University Press.
Axtell, G. (ed.) (1997) Knowledge, Belief, and Character, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little eld.
Baehr, J. (2004) “Virtue Epistemology,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/virtueep. Accessed March 13, 2018.
Baehr, J. (2011) The Inquiring Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Battaly, H. (2008) “Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 3: 639–663.
Battaly, H. (2017) “Intellectual Perseverance,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 14(6): 669–697.
Battaly, Heather D. (ed.) (2020). The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
Battaly, H. (forthcoming) “Intellectual Virtue and Knowledge,” in S. Hetherington (ed.) Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury.
Carter, J.A., A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, and D. Pritchard. (eds.) (2018) Extended Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Church, I. and P. Samuelson. (2017) Intellectual Humility, London: Bloomsbury.
Code, L. (1987) Epistemic Responsibility, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
Code, L. (2006) Ecological Thinking, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Bruin, B. (2015) Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elgin, C. (2017) True Enough, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Encabo, J.V. (2008) “Epistemic Merit, Autonomy, and Testimony,” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 23(61): 45–56.
Fricker, M. (2010) “Can There Be Institutional Virtues?” in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33–50.
Greco, J. (1994) “Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of ‘Relevant Possibility’,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 32: 61–77.
Greco, J. (2010) Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grimm, S. (ed.) (2017) Making Sense of the World: New Essays on Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kidd, I.J., J. Medina and G. Pohlhaus. (eds.) (2017) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, New York: Routledge.
Kieran, M. (2014) “Creativity as a Virtue of Character,” in E.S. Paul and S.B. Kaufman (eds.) The Philosophy of Creativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
King, N. (2014) “Erratum to Perseverance as an Intellectual Virtue,” Synthese 191(15): 3779–3801.
Kvanvig, J. (1992) The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind, Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kwong, J. (2017) “Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth?” Synthese 194(5): 1613–1626.
Lackey, J. (2007) “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know,” Synthese 158(3): 345–361.
Lackey, J. (ed.) (2014) Essays in Collective Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Le Morvan, P. (2011) “Healthy Skepticism and Practical Wisdom,” Logos and Episteme 2(1): 87–102.
Montmarquet, J. (1993) Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Pritchard, D. (2009) “Apt Performance and Epistemic Value,” Philosophical Studies 143: 407–416.
Roberts, R. and W.J. Wood. (2007) Intellectual Virtues, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riggs, W. (2003) “Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding,” in M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds.) Intellectual Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 203–227.
Riggs. W. (2010) “Open-Mindedness,” in H. Battaly (ed.) Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic, New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 173–188.
Sosa, E. (1980) “ The Raft and the Pyramid,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 3–25.
Sosa, E. (1991) Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. (2007) A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2015) Judgment and Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tanesini, A. (2018) “Intellectual Humility as Attitude,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96(2): 339–420.
Turri, J., M. Alfano, and J. Greco. (2017) “Virtue Epistemology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue. Accessed March 13, 2018.
Whitcomb, D. (2010) “Curiosity Was Framed,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(3): 664–687.
Whitcomb, D., H. Battaly, J. Baehr, and D. Howard-Snyder. (2017) “Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(3): 509–539.
Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2001) “Recovering Understanding,” in M. Steup (ed.) Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 235–251.
Zagzebski, L. (2009) On Epistemology, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Zagzebski, L. (2012) Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief, New York: Oxford University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2014) “Knowledge and the Motive for Truth,” in M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 140–145. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
專文寫作 |
100% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
2/18 |
Primary features of epistemic virtues
•Ernest Sosa - Telic Virtue Epistemology
•Linda Zagzebski - Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character |
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第2週 |
2/25 |
The motivations and emotions in the intellectual virtues
•James Montmarquet - Do Epistemic Virtues Require a Motivation for Truth?
•Michael S. Brady - The Role of Emotion in Intellectual Virtue |
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第3週 |
3/04 |
The value of intellectual virtues
•Anne Baril - What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable?
•Robert Lockie - Virtue Epistemology and the Sources of Epistemic Value |
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第4週 |
3/11 |
Ethical counterpart
•Jason Baehr - Virtue Epistemology, Virtue Ethics, and the Structure of Virtue |
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第5週 |
3/18 |
Alternative accounts of the intellectual virtues
•J Michael Slote - Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology: Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism
•Heather Battaly - A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism |
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第6週 |
3/25 |
Individual epistemic virtues: open-mindedness, curiosity, and creativity
•Wayne Riggs - Open-Mindedness
•Lani Watson - Curiosity and Inquisitiveness
•Matthew Kieran - Creativity as an Epistemic Virtue |
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第7週 |
4/01 |
Individual epistemic virtues: eight current accounts of intellectual humility
•Nancy E. Snow - Intellectual Humility |
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第8週 |
4/08 |
Individual epistemic virtues: epistemic virtues that are connected to trust
•Heidi Grasswick - Epistemic Autonomy in a Social World of Knowing
•Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - The Epistemic Virtue of Deference
•Allan Hazlett - Skepticism |
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第9週 |
4/15 |
Individual epistemic virtues: the virtue of epistemic justice
•Laura Beeby - Epistemic Justice: Three Models of Virtue |
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第10週 |
4/22 |
Individual epistemic virtues: epistemic courage
•Ian James Kidd - Epistemic Courage and the Harms of Epistemic Life |
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第11週 |
4/29 |
Individual epistemic virtues: perseverance
•Nathan King - Intellectual Perseverance |
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第12週 |
5/06 |
The credit theory of knowledge: a virtue reliabilist defense
•John Greco - Virtue, Knowledge, and Achievement |
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第13週 |
5/13 |
Worries about efforts by robust virtue reliabilists
•Duncan Pritchard - Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck
•Georgi Gardiner - Virtue Epistemology and Explanatory Salience |
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第14週 |
5/20 |
Abilism
•John Turri - Virtue Epistemology and Abilism on Knowledge |
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第15週 |
5/27 |
The value problem for virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge
•Anne Meylan - Virtue Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems |
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第16週 |
6/03 |
Connections between understanding and epistemic virtue
•Catherine Z. Elgin - Epistemic Virtues in Understanding
•Stephen R. Grimm - Understanding as an Intellectual Virtue |
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第17週 |
6/10 |
Active knowledge and understanding
•Robert Audi - Intellectual Virtue, Knowledge, and Justification
•Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood - Understanding, Humility, and the Vices of Pride |
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第18週 |
6/17 |
Extended and collective epistemic virtues
•Reza Lahroodi - Virtue Epistemology and Collective Epistemology
•J. Adam Carter - Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition |
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