課程資訊
課程名稱
專題研究:知識優先論
Independent Study: Knowledge First Epistemology 
開課學期
111-1 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
鄧敦民 
課號
Phl8835 
課程識別碼
124 D2560 
班次
 
學分
1.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期五2(9:10~10:00) 
上課地點
哲研討室三 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後,始得選課。
限博士班 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限:3人 
課程簡介影片
 
核心能力關聯
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖
課程大綱
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課程概述

Since Timothy Williamson published his influential book Knowledge and Its Limits in 2000, the "Knowledge First" theory has become a hot topic in the past two decades and is generally considered to be one of the most important innovations in contemporary epistemology. Williamson opposes and discontinues traditional knowledge analysis (conceptual analysis of knowledge into belief, truth, and justification or other elements), and advocates that knowledge is basic and cannot be conceptually analyzed. We should take knowledge as primitive and core, and use knowledge to understand other epistemic concepts such as belief, justification, evidence, etc. Williamson's theoretical image has been widely echoed, and there are various ways to participate in knowledge-first programs. In addition to in-depth exploration of the basic issues of the knowledge first theory itself (including defending its theoretical advantages, opposing its key elements, etc.), this course will also follow the hot and developing applied topics published in recent years, including virtue epistemology, New Evil Demon Problem, Sustaining Rules, Preponderance of the Evidence, etc., discuss and extend the development of these important emerging research directions in epistemology. 

課程目標
In the end of the course, students are expected to
(1) have a comprehensive understanding of the main issues on the knowledge-first epistemology;
(2) be familiar with the state of the art and the newest academic information in knowledge-first programs; and
(3) be capable of proposing original criticisms of the major issues of knowledge-first program and besides, develop their own views. 
課程要求
 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
指定閱讀
 
參考書目
指定閱讀:
Aidan McGlynn (2017) Mindreading Knowledge. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Anne Meylan (2017) In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Christoph Kelp (2017) Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Clayton Littlejohn (2017) How and Why Knowledge is First. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, Sanford (2009). The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hawthorne, John & Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria (2009). Knowledge and Objective Chance. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108.
Heather Logue (2017) Perception First? In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Ichikawa, Jonathan & Jenkins, C. S. I. (2017). On Putting Knowledge 'First'. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard (2017) Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-individualism, and Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
John Turri (2017) Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and C. S. I. Jenkins (2017) On putting Knowledge ‘First’. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Joshua Schechter (2017) No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Martin Smith (2017) The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2017) ‘More Likely Than Not’: Knowledge First and the Role of Bare Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Mikkel Gerken (2017) Against Knowledge-First Epistemology. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
Sosa, Ernest (2009). Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 203--16.
Williamson, Timothy. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, Timothy. (2017) Acting on Knowledge. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
參考書目:
Cappelen, Herman. 2011. Against Assertion. In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen, eds., Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21–48.
Carter, J. Adam, Benjamin Jarvis, and Katherine Rubin. 2013. Knowledge: Value on the Cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2): 249–63.
Carter, J. Adam, Benjamin Jarvis, and Katherine Rubin. 2016. Belief without Credence. Synthese, 193(8): 2323–2351. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6.
Carter, J. Adam, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard. 2014. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 24(1): 63–109.
Greco, John. 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hawthorne, John, and J. Stanley. 2008. Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105(10):571–90.
Ichikawa, Jonathan Jenkins, and Matthias Steup. 2014. The Analysis of Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
Jenkins, C. S. Ichikawa, and Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa. 2018. On Putting Knowledge First. In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis, eds., Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113–31.
Kallestrup, Jesper, and Duncan Pritchard. 2014. Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy 22(3): 335–57.
Kelp, Christoph. 2016. Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93(1): 79–100.
Kelp, Christoph. Forthcoming. Towards a Knowledge-Based Account of Understanding. In Stephen Grimm, Christoph Baumberger, and Sabine Ammon, eds., Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.
McGlynn, Aidan. 2014. Knowledge First? London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Nagel, Jennifer. 2013. Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275–310.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2014. Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good. In Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz, eds., The Ethics of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 112–29.
Sliwa, Paulina. 2015. IV—Understanding and Knowing. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115(1, pt. 1): 57–74. Wiley Online Library. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00384.x/full.
Srinivasan, Amia. 2015. Are We Luminous? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90(2):294–319.
Williamson, Timothy. 1995. Is Knowing a State of Mind? Mind 104(415): 533–65.
Williamson, Timothy. 1996. Knowing and Asserting. Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523. 
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