Course Information
Course title
 Independent Study: Contemporary Theories of Public Reason 
Semester
 109-1 
Designated for
 COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS  GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY  
Instructor
 Tse-Mei Wu 
Curriculum Number
 Phl7881 
Curriculum Identity Number
 124 M6100 
Class
  
Credits
 1.0 
Full/Half
Yr.
 Half 
Required/
Elective
 Elective 
Time
 Thursday 6(13:20~14:10) 
Remarks
 Restriction: MA students and beyond AND Restriction: within this department (including students taking minor and dual degree program)
The upper limit of the number of students: 3. 
Ceiba Web Server
 http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1091Phl7881 
Course introduction video
 
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning
 Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning
Course Syllabus
Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
Course Description

The idea of public reason regulates how officials and citizens justify their proposals about important political issues. John Rawls argues that only political values, which we can reasonably expect everyone to accept, can be public reasons. Gerald F. Gaus argues that people can appeal to different reasons based on comprehensive doctrines. Do the reasons used to justify political proposals contain some kind of consensus? This involves the problem of the structure of public reason and how we should imagine the citizens who endorse the reasons: Are they real persons or idealized persons? This course will focus on the structure of public reason and the problems of idealization. We will analyze and evaluate the reasonableness of different claims. 

Course Objective
 1. Understand the relevant discussion of public reason in contemporary political philosophy.
2. Understand the different claims and criticisms of the structure of public reason.
3. Integrate the content of this course with students’ own research. 
Course Requirement
 Finish assigned readings before class, participate in discussion during class, and finish a final's paper.  
Student Workload (expected study time outside of class per week)
  
Office Hours
  
References
 1. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
2. Rawls, J. (1996). ‘‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition,’’ in Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. xxxvii-lxii.
3. Rawls, J. (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” The University of Chicago Law Review 64, 3: 765-807.
4. Sandel, M. J. (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Quong, J. (2018). ‘‘Public Reason,’’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .
6. D’Agostino, F. (1996). Free Public Reason; Making it Up As We Go. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Gaus, G, & Vallier, K. (2009). “The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry, and Political Institutions,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 35, 1: 51-76.
8. Vallier, K. (2014). Liberalism and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. New York: Routledge.
9. Vallier, K. (2016). “Public Justification vs Public Deliberation: The Case for Divorce,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45, 2: 139-158.
10. Billingham, P. (2016). “Convergence Justifications Within Political Liberalism: A Defence,” Res Publica 22, 2: 135-153.
11. Billingham, P. (2017). “Convergence Liberalism and the Problem of Disagreement Concerning Public Justification,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, 4: 541-564.
12. Wall, S. (2013). “Public Reason and Moral Authoritarianism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, 250: 160-169.
13. Bohman, J. (2003). “Deliberative Toleration,” Political Theory 31, 3: 757–779.
14. Enoch, D. (2013). “The Disorder of Public Reason,” Ethics 123, 1: 141-176.
15. Enoch, D. (2015). “Against Public Reason,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 1). D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 112-142.
16. Enoch, D. (2017). “Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Volume 3). D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 132–165. 
Designated reading
 1. Gaus, G. (2003). “Justificatory Liberalism and Adjudicative Democracy: Public Reason and Umpiring,” in Contemporary Theories of Liberalism. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 205-234.
2. Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Quong, J. (2014). “What is the Point of Public Reason,” Philosophical Studies 170, 3: 545-553.
5. Raz, J. (1990). “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19, 1: 3-46.
6. Macedo, S. (2010). “Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public Sphere,” Social Science Research Network.
7. Vallier, K. (2011). “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 11, 1: 175-194.

 
Grading
  
No.
Item
%
Explanations for the conditions
1. 
 指定閱讀之摘要與提問 
25% 
  
2. 
 Participation 
25% 
  
3. 
 Final paper  
50% 
  
 
Progress
Week
Date
Topic
Week 1
 9/17  Raz, J. (1990). “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence.” Pp. 3-46. 
Week 2
 9/24  Gaus, G. (2003). “Justificatory Liberalism and Adjudicative Democracy: Public Reason and Umpiring.” Pp. 205-234. 
Week 3
 10/01  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 1-36.
Chapter1: Social Morality.
Chapter2: Moral Authority among Free and Equal Persons.
 
Week 4
 10/08  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 36-49, 232-257.
Chapter3: Evaluative Diversity and the Problem of Indeterminacy.
Chapter13: The Reason One Has.
 
Week 5
 10/15  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 261-292.
Chapter14: On Modeling Public Justification.
 
Week 6
 10/22  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 292-333.
Chapter15: Proposals.
Chapter16: Evaluating Proposals and the Problem of Indeterminacy.
 
Week 7
 10/29  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 334-370.
Chapter17: Arguments from Abstraction and the Claims of Agency.
 
Week 8
 11/05  Gaus, G. (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Pp. 389-424.
Chapter19: Coordinating on a Morality.
Chapter20: The Evolution of Morality.
 
Week 9
 11/12  Macedo, S. (2010). “Why Public Reason? Citizens’ Reasons and the Constitution of the Public Sphere.” Pp. 1-37. 
Week 10
 11/19  1. Quong, J. (2014). “What is the Point of Public Reason.” Pp. 545-553.
2. Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 1-11. Introduction.
 
Week 11
 11/26  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 108-136.
Chapter 4: Justification and Legitimacy.
 
Week 12
 12/03  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 137-160.
Chapter5: A Question Internal to Liberal Theory.
 
Week 13
 12/10  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 161-191.
Chapter6: The Role of an Overlapping Consensus.
 
Week 14
 12/17  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 192-220.
Chapter7: Disagreement and Asymmetry.
 
Week 15
 12/24  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 256-289.
Chapter9: The Scope and Structure of Public Reason.
 
Week 16
 12/31  Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without Perfection. Pp. 290-314.
Chapter10: Unreasonable Citizens.
 
Week 17
 1/07  Vallier, K. (2011). “On Jonathan Quong’s Sectarian Political Liberalism.” Pp. 175-194. 
Week 18
 1/14  期末綜合討論