課程名稱 |
專題研究:真理的修正理論 Independent Study: The Revision Theory of Truth |
開課學期 |
110-1 |
授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
課號 |
Phl7889 |
課程識別碼 |
124 M6180 |
班次 |
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學分 |
1.0 |
全/半年 |
半年 |
必/選修 |
選修 |
上課時間 |
星期五1(8:10~9:00) |
上課地點 |
哲研討室二 |
備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後,始得選課。 限碩士班以上 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生) 總人數上限:3人 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
課程大綱
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課程概述 |
真理的修正理論(The Revision Theory of Truth)為一種以古典邏輯為基礎的真理理論,試圖以修正序列(revision process)來釐清包含真理謂詞(truth predicate)的語言的真理概念,以幫助解決說謊者悖論。自從上世紀八零年代由Herzberger 1982a, 1982b和Gupta 1982首開先河,並於Gupta and Belnap 1993完成整體理論架構,真理的修正理論不但已經成為探討說謊者悖論的經典理論,並且在模糊性(vagueness)和抽象事物(abstract objects)等議題的討論上也有應用。本專題旨在仔細研究真理的修正理論,除了閱讀上述經典文獻以外,亦旁及Asmus 2013和王文方2011等衍生性的重要應用,以期對真理的修正理論有完整的認識。 |
課程目標 |
使學生熟悉真理的修正理論,了解其形式架構與性質,以及相關的哲學詮釋,和特定哲學議題上的應用,以期深化對真理相關議題如說謊者悖論等之研究。 |
課程要求 |
每週閱讀指定內容,並寫作短文,定期討論。 |
預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Antonelli, G.A., 1994, “The complexity of revision”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 204–218.
Asmus C.M., 2013, “Vagueness and revision sequences”, Synthese, 190: 953–974.
Belnap, N., 2006, “Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 705–712.
Berker S., 2011, “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 17–39.
Chapuis, A., 1996, “Alternate revision theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 399–423.
Gupta, A., 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60.
–––, 2006, Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Halbach, V., 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herzberger, H.G., 1982a, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102.
–––, 1982b, “Naive semantics and the liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–497.
Horsten, L., 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horsten, L., Leigh, G.E., Leitgeb, H., and Welch, P., 2012, “Revision Revisited”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5: 642–665.
Restall, G., 2005, “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too”, in Deflation and Paradox, JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–106.
Wang, W., 2011, “Theories of abstract objects without ad hoc restriction”, Erkenntnis 74: 1–15.
Yaqūb, A., 1993, The Liar Speaks the Truth : A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2008, “Two types of deflationist”, Synthese, 165: 77–106.
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參考書目 |
Antonelli, G.A., 1994, “The complexity of revision”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 204–218.
Asmus C.M., 2013, “Vagueness and revision sequences”, Synthese, 190: 953–974.
Belnap, N., 2006, “Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 705–712.
Berker S., 2011, “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 17–39.
Chapuis, A., 1996, “Alternate revision theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 399–423.
Gupta, A., 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60.
–––, 2006, Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Halbach, V., 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herzberger, H.G., 1982a, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102.
–––, 1982b, “Naive semantics and the liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–497.
Horsten, L., 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horsten, L., Leigh, G.E., Leitgeb, H., and Welch, P., 2012, “Revision Revisited”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5: 642–665.
Restall, G., 2005, “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too”, in Deflation and Paradox, JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–106.
Wang, W., 2011, “Theories of abstract objects without ad hoc restriction”, Erkenntnis 74: 1–15.
Yaq?b, A., 1993, The Liar Speaks the Truth : A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2008, “Two types of deflationist”, Synthese, 165: 77–106. |
評量方式 (僅供參考) |
No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
1. |
參與討論 |
40% |
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2. |
課堂報告 |
60% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
第1週 |
9/24 |
課程介紹 |
第2週 |
10/01 |
Herzberger, “Notes on naive semantics” and “Naive semantics and the liar paradox” |
第3週 |
10/08 |
Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Introduction and Chapter 1 |
第4週 |
10/15 |
Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 2 |
第5週 |
10/22 |
Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 3 |
第6週 |
10/29 |
Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 4 |
第7週 |
11/05 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 1 |
第8週 |
11/12 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 2 |
第9週 |
11/19 |
Midterm week |
第10週 |
11/26 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 3 |
第11週 |
12/03 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 4 |
第12週 |
12/10 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 5 |
第13週 |
12/17 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 6 |
第14週 |
12/24 |
Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 7 |
第15週 |
12/31 |
Halbach, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Chapter 11 |
第16週 |
1/07 |
Horsten, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Chapter 8 |
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