課程資訊
課程名稱
專題研究:真理的修正理論
Independent Study: The Revision Theory of Truth 
開課學期
110-1 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
鄧敦民 
課號
Phl7889 
課程識別碼
124 M6180 
班次
 
學分
1.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期五1(8:10~9:00) 
上課地點
哲研討室二 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。請先徵得授課教師及申請者同意後,始得選課。
限碩士班以上 且 限本系所學生(含輔系、雙修生)
總人數上限:3人 
 
課程簡介影片
 
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課程概述

真理的修正理論(The Revision Theory of Truth)為一種以古典邏輯為基礎的真理理論,試圖以修正序列(revision process)來釐清包含真理謂詞(truth predicate)的語言的真理概念,以幫助解決說謊者悖論。自從上世紀八零年代由Herzberger 1982a, 1982b和Gupta 1982首開先河,並於Gupta and Belnap 1993完成整體理論架構,真理的修正理論不但已經成為探討說謊者悖論的經典理論,並且在模糊性(vagueness)和抽象事物(abstract objects)等議題的討論上也有應用。本專題旨在仔細研究真理的修正理論,除了閱讀上述經典文獻以外,亦旁及Asmus 2013和王文方2011等衍生性的重要應用,以期對真理的修正理論有完整的認識。 

課程目標
使學生熟悉真理的修正理論,了解其形式架構與性質,以及相關的哲學詮釋,和特定哲學議題上的應用,以期深化對真理相關議題如說謊者悖論等之研究。 
課程要求
每週閱讀指定內容,並寫作短文,定期討論。 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
指定閱讀
Antonelli, G.A., 1994, “The complexity of revision”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 204–218.
Asmus C.M., 2013, “Vagueness and revision sequences”, Synthese, 190: 953–974.
Belnap, N., 2006, “Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 705–712.
Berker S., 2011, “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 17–39.
Chapuis, A., 1996, “Alternate revision theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 399–423.
Gupta, A., 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60.
–––, 2006, Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Halbach, V., 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herzberger, H.G., 1982a, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102.
–––, 1982b, “Naive semantics and the liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–497.
Horsten, L., 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horsten, L., Leigh, G.E., Leitgeb, H., and Welch, P., 2012, “Revision Revisited”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5: 642–665.
Restall, G., 2005, “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too”, in Deflation and Paradox, JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–106.
Wang, W., 2011, “Theories of abstract objects without ad hoc restriction”, Erkenntnis 74: 1–15.
Yaqūb, A., 1993, The Liar Speaks the Truth : A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2008, “Two types of deflationist”, Synthese, 165: 77–106.
 
參考書目
Antonelli, G.A., 1994, “The complexity of revision”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 204–218.
Asmus C.M., 2013, “Vagueness and revision sequences”, Synthese, 190: 953–974.
Belnap, N., 2006, “Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 705–712.
Berker S., 2011, “Gupta’s gambit”, Philosophical Studies, 152: 17–39.
Chapuis, A., 1996, “Alternate revision theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 399–423.
Gupta, A., 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60.
–––, 2006, Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Halbach, V., 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herzberger, H.G., 1982a, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102.
–––, 1982b, “Naive semantics and the liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–497.
Horsten, L., 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horsten, L., Leigh, G.E., Leitgeb, H., and Welch, P., 2012, “Revision Revisited”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5: 642–665.
Restall, G., 2005, “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too”, in Deflation and Paradox, JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–106.
Wang, W., 2011, “Theories of abstract objects without ad hoc restriction”, Erkenntnis 74: 1–15.
Yaq?b, A., 1993, The Liar Speaks the Truth : A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2008, “Two types of deflationist”, Synthese, 165: 77–106. 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
參與討論  
40% 
 
2. 
課堂報告 
60% 
 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
9/24  課程介紹 
第2週
10/01  Herzberger, “Notes on naive semantics” and “Naive semantics and the liar paradox” 
第3週
10/08  Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Introduction and Chapter 1 
第4週
10/15  Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 2 
第5週
10/22  Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 3 
第6週
10/29  Yaqūb, The Liar Speaks the Truth, Chapter 4 
第7週
11/05  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 1 
第8週
11/12  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 2 
第9週
11/19  Midterm week 
第10週
11/26  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 3 
第11週
12/03  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 4 
第12週
12/10  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 5 
第13週
12/17  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 6 
第14週
12/24  Gupta and Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, Chapter 7 
第15週
12/31  Halbach, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Chapter 11 
第16週
1/07  Horsten, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Chapter 8