課程資訊
課程名稱
知識論專題:封閉原則
Seminar in Epistemology:The Closure Principle 
開課學期
103-2 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
彭孟堯 
課號
Phl7770 
課程識別碼
124 M7460 
班次
 
學分
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期三5,6,7(12:20~15:10) 
上課地點
哲研討室二 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。B領域。
總人數上限:15人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1032Phl7770_ 
課程簡介影片
 
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課程概述

中文:當代有關於外在世界的激進懷疑論者常利用知識封閉性原則去論證他們的立場。為了反駁這樣的懷疑論,有些學者主張我們應該重新檢視知識的標準,以便發現上述懷疑論論證中的問題,特別是知識封閉性原則是否成立的問題。這些學者中有兩類極為受到重視:一類是主張知識的成立與否只涉及「相關的」可能性的相關選擇理論學者,如D. Lewis、F. Dretske、和M. Heller,另一類則是主張知識的成立與否與某些虛擬條件有關的虛擬論者,如R. Nozic、E. Sosa、和K. DeRose。不幸的是,對於這兩類理論的討論往往流於直覺層面而缺乏邏輯的嚴謹性。為了彌補這個缺點,W. Holliday最近利用了兩種新的形式化語意論去重新模塑了上述兩類理論,並嚴格證明了每個理論在知識封閉性問題上的結果,他的形式化工作和證明帶來了極為嚴格而又豐碩的成果。本課程的主要目的便在對從Dretske以降的這一序列知識論討論做出充分的掌握。


英文:Contemporary skeptics about our knowledge of the external world typically argue for their position by appeal to the principle of knowledge closure. To respond to the skeptical challenge, some epistemologists propose that we need to re-examine our criterion of knowledge so as to expose problems of skepticism. This maneuver, in particular, has to do with whether the principle of knowledge closure is plausible or not. One approach concerns with the "relevant alternatives" proposal. Dretske, Lewis, and Heller are the main advocators. Another approach, advocated by Nozick, Sosa, and DeRose, concerns with whether and how the interpretation in terms of subjunctive conditionals is relevant to our theory of human knowledge. Unfortunately, the two approaches are typically based on mere intuitions and lack logical rigor. To remedy this, recently W. Holliday employs two new versions of formal semantics to re-shape the above two approaches. His work on the formalization and rigorous proofs provide us rich results. This course is to introduce and explain the development beginning from Dretske and up to Holiday. 

課程目標
中文:引領學生理解與懷疑論問題有關的知識論理論,並對這些理論的邏輯結果有著充分的掌握。

英文:To introduce students to issues with regard to contemporary skepticism and its logical consequences. 
課程要求
具備知識論基礎 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
每週五 13:30~14:30
每週三 13:30~14:30 
參考書目
詳底下分週進度表 
指定閱讀
詳底下分週進度表 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
Mid term report 
30% 
problem oriented literature review; 4 – 8 pages, typed, double spaced 
2. 
term paper 
60% 
10 –15 pages, typed, double spaced, in academic format 
3. 
presentation 
10% 
30 minutes 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
2/25  本門課內容解說,基本概念與問題介紹 
第2週
3/04  Nozick, R., 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press, 167-247. 
第3週
3/11  Nozick, R., 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press, 167-247. 
第4週
3/18  Dretske, F., 1970. "Epistemic Operators", The Jouranl of Philosophy 67(24): 1007-1023.
Dretske, F., 1981. "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge", Philosophical Studies, 40(3): 363-378.
Dretske, F., 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell, especially pp. 13-26. 
第5週
3/25  Dretske, F., 1970. "Epistemic Operators", The Jouranl of Philosophy 67(24): 1007-1023.
Dretske, F., 1981. "The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge", Philosophical Studies, 40(3): 363-378.
Dretske, F., 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell, especially pp. 13-26. 
第6週
4/01  Spring break 
第7週
4/08  Murphy, P. (2006), "A Strategy for Assessing Closure", Erkenntnis 65: 365-383.
Sosa, E., 1999. "How to Defeat Opposition to Moore", Nous, 33(13): 141-153. 
第8週
4/15  Presentation 
第9週
4/22  Presentation 
第10週
4/29  Lewis, D., 1996. "Elusive Knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4): 549-567.
Lewis, D. "Scorekeeping in a Language Game". Downloadable from http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Courses/PHI534-2012-13/Nov26/Scorekeeping_20in_20a_20Language_20Game.pdf 
第11週
5/06  DeRose, K. "Solving the Skeptical Problem". Philosophical Review 104(1): 1-52. 
第12週
5/13  DeRose, K. "Solving the Skeptical Problem". Philosophical Review 104(1): 1-52. 
第13週
5/20  Heller M., 1989. "Relevant Alternatives", Philosophical Studies, 55(1): 23-40. 
第14週
5/27  Heller M., 1999. "Relevant Alternatives and Closure", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77(2): 196-208. 
第15週
6/03  Holliday, W. H., 2014. "Epistemic Closure and Eistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. A Summary", Journal of Philosophical Logic, downloadable at http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/page/128. 
第16週
6/10  Holliday, W. H., 2014. "Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge", Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 5, downloadable at http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/page/128. 
第17週
6/17  Holliday, W. H., 2014. "Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge", Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 5, downloadable at http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/page/128. 
第18週
6/24  繳交學期論文