課程資訊
課程名稱
身體經驗的跨領域研究三
Interdisciplinary Investigations of Bodily Experiences (Ⅲ) 
開課學期
110-1 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
梁益堉 
課號
Phl7779 
課程識別碼
124 M7650 
班次
 
學分
3.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期三2,3,4(9:10~12:10) 
上課地點
哲研討室二 
備註
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。研究所:E領域。 大學部:(C)哲學專題群組。
總人數上限:10人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1101Phl7779_IIBE3 
課程簡介影片
 
核心能力關聯
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖
課程大綱
為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
課程概述

這是一門關於「身體經驗」之進階的研究型課程,選課同學需先修過「身體經驗的跨領域研究 I或II」。我們會深入探討許多涉及「身體經驗」的哲學與科學議題。例如:虛擬實境如何影響我們的「身體歸屬感」?「身體動作感」與「視覺動作感」在產生身體錯覺的過程中扮演了何種角色?「我感覺自己在哪裡」和「我感覺身體在哪裡」所涉及的是同一種經驗嗎?擁有「身體歸屬感」就必然保證有相應的「經驗歸屬感」嗎?我們除了討論相關的哲學作品與腦神經科學的論文,也會嘗試設計實驗來研究各種身體錯覺。例如:「自我觸碰錯覺」、「身體交換錯覺」,以及我們最近在「神經科學與哲學研究室」設計的新版「全身錯覺」等。研究這些新議題將有助於瞭解身體、大腦與意識之間的複雜關係,以及其神經機制。 

課程目標
本課程有四項目標:第一,能瞭解與身體經驗相關的哲學問題。第二,學習設計實驗來從事跨領域研究。第三,學習如何仔細閱讀哲學與科學論文,並練習使寫作更為清晰。第四,對於一些重要議題能發展出自己的想法。 
課程要求
學生除了得花功夫研讀困難的哲學作品,在上課時參與討論,評估各種立場的論證,也需要在作業中提出自己的觀點,並加以辯護。 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
參考書目
1. Alsmith, A. J. and M. R. Longo (2014). "Where exactly am I? Self-location judgments distribute between head and torso." Conscious Cogn 24: 70-74.
2. Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13, 556-571.
3. Botvinick, M., and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669), 756. doi:10.1038/35784.
4. Ehrsson, H. H. (2007). The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science 317(5841): 1048.
5. Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). “The concept of body ownership and its relation to multisensory integration,” In The New Handbook of Multisensory Processes, Chapter 43, ed. B. E. Stein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 775–792.
6. Gallagher, S. (2012) First-person perspective and immunity to error through misidentification. In S. Miguens and G. Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Frankfurt: Philosophical Analysis Ontos Publisher, 187-214.
7. Guterstam, A., Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). The illusion of owning a third arm. PLoS One, 6(2), e17208.
8. Guterstam, A., Gentile, G. and Ehrsson, H.H. (2013) The Invisible Hand Illusion Multisensory Integration Leads to the Embodiment of a Discrete Volume of Empty Space, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25:7, 1078–1099.
9. Heydrich, L. et al. (2013). Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies–Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques. Frontiers in psychology, 4. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00946
10. Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Moving a rubber hand that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00040
11. Legrand, D. (2006). The bodily self: The sensorimotor roots of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 89-118.
12. Legrand, D. (2007) Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 583-599;
13. Legrand, D. (2010). Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 180-200. Springer Netherlands.
14. Lenggenhager, B., et al. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317(5841): 1096-1099.
15. Liang, C. (2016). “Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(T), 1-19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
16. Liang, C. (2016). “Can Experiential Ownership Violate the
Immunity Principle? —A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(R), 1-6. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
17. Liang C, Chang S-Y, Chen W-Y, Huang H-C and Lee Y-T. (2015). Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion. Front.Psychol. 5:1591.
18. Maselli, A., and Slater, M. (2014). Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:693, 1-19.
19. Newport, R., Pearce, R., Preston. C. (2010). Fake hands in action: embodiment and control of supernumerary limbs. Exp Brain Res. 204:385–395.
20. Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008a). Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 219–239.
21. Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008b). I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 411–424.
22. Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self- attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(1), 80-91.
23. Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body- ownership. Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 703-712.
24. Tsakiris, M. (2011). The sense of body ownership. In The Oxford handbook of self, ed. S. Gallagher (New York: Oxford University Press), 180–203.
25. Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame. Oxford University Press. 
指定閱讀
Readings will be selected from the following list:
Alsmith, A. J. and M. R. Longo (2014). "Where exactly am I?
Self-location judgments distribute between head and torso." Conscious Cogn 24: 70-74.
Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily
self-consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 13, 556-571.
Botvinick, M., and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature, 391(6669), 756. doi:10.1038/35784.
Ehrsson, H. H. (2007). The experimental induction of
out-of-body experiences. Science 317(5841): 1048.
Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). “The concept of body ownership and its relation to multisensory integration,” In The New Handbook of Multisensory Processes, Chapter 43, ed. B. E. Stein (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 775–792.
Gallagher, S. (2012) First-person perspective and immunity to error through misidentification. In S. Miguens and G. Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Frankfurt: Philosophical Analysis Ontos Publisher, 187-214.
Guterstam, A., Petkova, V. I., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2011). The illusion of owning a third arm. PLoS One, 6(2), e17208.
Guterstam, A., Gentile, G. and Ehrsson, H.H. (2013) The Invisible Hand Illusion Multisensory Integration Leads to the Embodiment of a Discrete Volume of Empty Space, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25:7, 1078–1099.
Heydrich, L. et al. (2013). Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies–Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques. Frontiers in psychology, 4. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00946
Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H. H. (2012). Moving a rubber hand
that feels like your own: a dissociation of ownership and agency. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 6. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00040
Legrand, D. (2006). The bodily self: The sensorimotor roots of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5(1), 89-118.
Legrand, D. (2007) Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 583-599;
Legrand, D. (2010). Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 180-200. Springer Netherlands.
Lenggenhager, B., et al. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating
bodily self-consciousness. Science 317(5841): 1096-1099.
Liang, C. (2015). “Self-as-Subject and Experiential
Ownership”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(T), 1-19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
Liang, C. (2015). “Can Experiential Ownership Violate the
Immunity Principle? —A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(R), 1-6. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
Liang C, Chang S-Y, Chen W-Y, Huang H-C and Lee Y-T. (2015). Body ownership and experiential ownership in the self-touching illusion. Front.Psychol. 5:1591.
Maselli, A., and Slater, M. (2014). Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:693, 1-19.
Newport, R., Pearce, R., Preston. C. (2010). Fake hands in action: embodiment and control of supernumerary limbs. Exp Brain Res. 204:385–395.
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008a). Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 219–239.
Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008b). I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 411–424.
Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self- attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(1), 80-91.
Tsakiris, M. (2010). My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body- ownership. Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 703-712.
Tsakiris, M. (2011). The sense of body ownership. In The Oxford handbook of self, ed. S. Gallagher (New York: Oxford University Press), 180–203.
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity,
Empathy and Shame. Oxford University Press.
 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
Discussion 
10% 
 
2. 
Presentation 
40% 
 
3. 
Final Paper 
50% 
 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
9/22  Introduction: bodily experiences and philosophical issues 
第2週
9/29  Philosophical views
1.Legrand, D. (2010). Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness. In Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 180-200. Springer Netherlands.
 
第3週
10/06  Philosophical views
1. Selected portions from Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 
第4週
10/13  Body Ownership
1. Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(1), 80-91.
2. Tsakiris, M. (2011). The sense of body ownership. In The Oxford handbook of self, ed. S. Gallagher (New York: Oxford University Press), 180–203.
 
第5週
10/20  The invisible hand illusion
1. Guterstam, A., Gentile, G. and Ehrsson, H.H. (2013) The Invisible Hand Illusion Multisensory Integration Leads to the Embodiment of a Discrete Volume of Empty Space, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25:7, 1078–1099.
 
第6週
10/27  Pilot study 1 in NeuroPhilosophy Lab 
第7週
11/03  Agency
1. Newport, R., Pearce, R., Preston. C. (2010). Fake hands in action: embodiment and control of supernumerary limbs. Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395.
2. Synofzik, M., Vosgerau, G., and Newen, A. (2008b). I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 411–424.
 
第8週
11/10  Self-location
1. Alsmith, A. J. and M. R. Longo (2014). "Where exactly am I? Self-location judgments distribute between head and torso." Conscious Cogn 24: 70-74.
2. Maselli, A., and Slater, M. (2014). Sliding perspectives: dissociating ownership from self-location during full body illusions in virtual reality. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8:693, 1-19.
 
第9週
11/17  First presentation 
第10週
11/24  Pilot study 2 in NeuroPhilosophy Lab 
第11週
12/01  Full-body illusions
1. Lenggenhager, B., et al. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317(5841): 1096-1099.
2. Ehrsson, H. H. (2007). The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences. Science 317(5841): 1048.
 
第12週
12/08  Virtual reality and bodily experience
1. Heydrich, L. et al. (2013). Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies–Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques. Frontiers in psychology, 4. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00946
 
第13週
12/15  Pilot study 3 in NeuroPhilosophy Lab 
第14週
12/22  Experiential ownership
1. Liang, C. (2015). “Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership”, In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 24(T), 1-19. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
 
第15週
12/29  Pilot study 4 in NeuroPhilosophy Lab 
第16週
1/05  Philosophical views
1. Selected portions from Zahavi, D. (2014). Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy and Shame. Oxford University Press.
 
第17週
1/12  Second presentation - Last Class 
第18週
1/19  Final paper due