課程資訊
課程名稱
費雪的自由意志形上學
Fischer's Metaphysics of Free Will 
開課學期
106-2 
授課對象
文學院  哲學研究所  
授課教師
文哲 
課號
Phl7554 
課程識別碼
124EM7800 
班次
 
學分
3.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期四A,B,C(18:25~21:05) 
上課地點
哲研討室二 
備註
本課程以英語授課。B領域。
總人數上限:15人 
 
課程簡介影片
 
核心能力關聯
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖
課程大綱
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課程概述

Common Sense has it that we are responsible for what we do. Human beings are rational and morally responsible. Common sense also has it that this requires having free will. But what exactly is this thing called “free will” and do we really have it? Our growing knowledge of socialization, genetics, and the brain seems to contradict this idea. Also thinking abstractly about action, cause, and chance will easily make one wonder whether free will is possible at all. The Stoics already thought about this problem. From everyday life, we know that we are sometimes free to do as we like and sometimes not free to do as we like. We know that we cannot fly like a bird even if we like to; and when we are in chains we cannot go for a walk as we please. But does it make sense to say we are free to will as we like, or not free to will as we like? What is this think, called the “will”? It seems to be something deep inside of us, the core of our personality and our self, our soul, something spiritual, untouchable, and independent from the past and the environment. It seems to be somehow absolutely free. In the end, a choice is said to be up to us. In everyday life, there are alternatives and we make choices. It seems to us that we can do A or B, and once having done A, it seems to us that we could have equally chosen to do B. But what was the cause of our action? My soul? My brain? Me? What does it mean to say “I” did it? If the world is deterministic, as classical physics teaches us so that the past and the laws of nature together determine the present and the future, will we be free? If someone can predict what we think and feel and do, will we still call ourselves “free”? Will we be in control of what we do? Or will be we be puppets attached to the past and the laws of nature, conscious of ourselves and of the world around us, but walking around with the illusion to be free and in full control although we actually are not free and not in control because everything is predetermined? These are the questions that are dealt with i 

課程目標
Free will involves many central and problematic ideas in philosophy, such as determinism, mind-body identity, mind-brain identity, personal identity, control, self, responsibility, and morality. The course objective is to arrive at a better understanding of these ideas, which are deep and part of metaphysics. 
課程要求
待補 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
參考書目
There are collections of essays by Fischer. Towards the end of the course, we will read some of these essays. Two collections are:
“ My Way. Essays on Moral Responsibility,” by John Martin Fischer, Oxford 2006.
“Deep Control. Essays on Free Will and Value,” by John Martin Fischer, Oxford 1012.
There is also a book by Fischer and Ravizza:
“Responsibility and Control. A Theory of Moral Responsibility,” by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, S.J., Cambridge 1998.
Furthermore, useful collections of essays on free will by various authors have come out. Here are three such collections:
“The Oxford Handbook of Free Will,” by Robert Kane (ed.), OUP 2002;
“Free Will”, second edition, edited by Gary Watson, Oxford University Press 2003;
“The Routledge Companion to Free Will,” Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, and Neil Levy (eds.), Routledge 2016.
And here is a list of single-authored books:
“Freedom of the Individual,” by Stuart Hampshire, Harper and Row 1965;
“Free Will,” by D.J. O’Connor, The MacMillan Press 1971; “Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting,” by Daniel Dennett, MIT 1984;
“Freedom and Belief,” by Galen Strawson, OUP 1986;
“Freedom within Reason,” by Susan Wolf, OUP 1990;
“The Significance of Free Will,” by Robert Kane, OUP 1998;
“Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will,” by Timothy O’Connor, OUP 2000;
“Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,” by Randolph Clarke, OUP 2003;
“Willensfreiheit,” by Geert Keil, Walter de Gruyter 2007; “Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility,“ by Tamler Sommers, Princeton UP 2012.
 
指定閱讀
Our main text is:
“The Metaphysics of Freedom. An Essay on Control,” by John Martin Fischer, Blackwell 1994. 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
 
No.
項目
百分比
說明
1. 
Participation 
30% 
 
2. 
Midterm 
30% 
 
3. 
Final  
40% 
 
 
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第1週
3/01  第1週 Introduction 
第2週
3/08  第2週 The issues 1-14 
第3週
3/15  第3週 The issues 14-22 
第4週
3/22  第4週 The Transfer Principle: Its Plausibility 23-45 
第5週
3/29  第5週 The Transfer Principle: Its Role 46-66 
第6週
4/05  第6週 The Laws and the Past: The Conditional Version 67-86 
第7週
4/12  第7週 The Basic Version and Newcomb’s Problem 87-110 
第8週
4/19  第8週 Review 
第9週
4/26  第9週 Midterm 
第10週
5/03  第10週 The Facts 111-130 
第11週
5/10  第11週 Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 131-147 
第12週
5/17  第12週 Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 147-159 
第13週
5/24  第13週 Moral Responsibility and Guidance Control 160-171 
第14週
5/31  第14週 Moral Responsibility and Guidance Control 172-189 
第15週
6/07  第15週 Putting it Together 191-216 
第16週
6/14  第16週 Selected Essay by Fischer 
第17週
6/21  第17週 Further Selected Essay by Fischer