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課程名稱 |
形上立基
Metaphysical Grounding |
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開課學期 |
110-2 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
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課號 |
Phl7577 |
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課程識別碼 |
124 M8200 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期五7,8,9(14:20~17:20) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室二 |
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備註 |
本課程中文授課,使用英文教科書。研究所：B領域。
大學部：(C)哲學專題群組。
總人數上限：15人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1102Phl7577_ |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
近年來，愈來愈多形上學家相信實在界具有某種結構，其中較為不基本之事可被立基於較為基本之事。這個「立基」可說是某種非因果的依賴性，用以支持形上解釋。許多傳統的形上學主張，包括物理主義、自然主義、一元論、社會建構論等等，皆被宣稱透過這個「立基」概念，找到了更好的表達方式。因此，許多人認為「立基」概念已經取代了「模態」概念，成為「後模態」革命後最重要的形上學新工具。
然而，「立基」究竟是什麼呢？令人驚訝的是，就連「立基」的提倡者，對此問題也少有共識，也因此在最近這十多年，「立基」的哲學文獻量有著爆炸性的成長。這些爭辯包括了以下的議題：立基是關係嗎？如果是，立基的關係項又是什麼呢？立基是否可用存有依賴性或本質依賴性來理解？立基是否就是形上解釋？什麼立基了立基關係？立基關係是否是必然關係？不同的立基關係，是否具有足夠的統一性，使得立基是個有用的關係？立基是否是個嚴格偏序關係？立基是否是個良基關係？在本課程中，我們將會進入形上立基的文獻，仔細研讀這些問題。
[自4/15起，本課程以線上遠距方式上課] |
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課程目標 |
本課程目標在於使學生
(1) 完整掌握立基在當代形上學中扮演的角色；
(2) 對於文獻中關於立基的主要議題有一些理解；
(3) 發展自己關於立基的觀點。 |
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課程要求 |
每週修課同學須閱讀指定閱讀材料，並輪流進行課堂報告。上課時修課同學亦須參與課堂討論。 |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
1. Bliss, R. (2018). “Grounding and Reflexivity”, in R. Bliss and G. Priest (eds.), Reality and Its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality, pp. 70-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Bliss, R. (2020). “Fundamentality”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.336-347. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Bohn, E. D. (2018). “Infinitely Descending Ground”, in R. Bliss and G. Priest (eds.), Reality and Its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality, pp. 167-181. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Correia, F. (2020). “Granularity”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.228-243. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Dasgupta, S. (2017). “Constitutive Explanation”, Philosophical Issues, 27: 74-97.
6. Dixon, T. S. (2020). “Infinite Descent”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.244-258. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. deRosset, L. (2013). “Grounding Explanations”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(7): 1-26.
8. Fine, K. (2001). “The Question of Realism”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 1(1): 1-30.
9. Fine, K. (2010). “Some Puzzles of Ground”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51(1): 97-118.
10. Glazier, M. (2015). “Laws and the Completeness of the Fundamental”, in M. Jago (ed.), Reality Making, pp. 11-37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
11. Glazier, M. (2020). “Explanation”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.121-132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. Koslicki, K. (2020). “Skeptical Doubts”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.164-179. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Kovacs, D. M. (2020). “Modality”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp. 348-360. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Kramer, S. (2018). “Towards a Theory of Ground-Theoretic Content”, Synthese, 195(2): 785-814.
15. Kramer, S. (2020). “Puzzles”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.271-282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Litland, J. E. (2020). “Meta-Ground”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.133-147. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Leuenberger, S. (2014a). “Grounding and Necessity”, Inquiry, 57: 151-174.
18. Leuenberber, S. (2014b). “From Grounding to Supervenience?” Erkenntnis, 79: 227-240.
19. Raven, M. (2016). “Fundamentality without Foundations”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3): 607-626.
20. Rosen, G. (2010). “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction”, in B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, pp. 109-136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21. Schaffer, J. (2009). “On What Grounds What”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, pp. 347-383. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Schaffer, J. (2016). “Grounding in the Image of Causation”, Philosophical Studies, 173(1): 49-100.
23. Skiles, A. (2020). “Necessity”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.148-163. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24. Thompson, N. (2020). “Strict Partial Order”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp. 259-270. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Wang, J. (2020). “Cause”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.300-311. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Wilsch, T. (2020). “Laws of Metaphysics”, in M. J. Raven (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp.425-436. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
27. Wilson, J. (2014). “No Work for a Theory of Grounding”, Inquiry, 57: 535-579. |
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參考書目 |
1. Audi, P. (2012). “A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding”, in F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 101-121). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Barnes, E. (2014). “Going Beyond the Fundamental: Feminism in Contemporary Metaphysics”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114(3pt3), 335-351.
3. Barnes, E. (2018). “Symmetric Dependence”, in R. Bliss & G. Priest (Eds.), Reality and Its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality (pp. 50-69). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Bennett, K. (2011). “By Our Bootstraps”, Philosophical Perspectives, 25(1), 27-41.
5. Bennett, K. (2017). Making Things Up. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Berker, S. (2018). “The Unity of Grounding”, Mind, 127(507), 729-777.
7. Bliss, R. (2013). “Viciousness and the structure of reality”, Philosophical Studies, 166(2), 399-418.
8. Bliss, R. (2014). “Viciousness and Circles of Ground”, Metaphilosophy, 45(2), 245-256.
9. Bricker, P. (2006). “The Relation between General and Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2, 251-287.
10. Cameron, M. A. (2014). “Is Ground Said-in-Many-Ways?” Studia Philosophica Estonica, 7(2), 29-55.
11. Cameron, R. P. (2008). “Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(230), 1-14.
12. Daly, C. (2012). “Scepticism about grounding”, In F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 81-100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Dasgupta, S. (2014). “The Possibility of Physicalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 111(9), 557-592.
14. Dixon, T. S. (2016). “What Is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding?” Mind, 125(498), 439-468.
15. Fine, K. (2012). “Guide to Ground”, in F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 37-80). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Fine, K. (2015). “Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(2), 296-311.
17. Fine, K. (2016). “Identity Criteria and Ground”, Philosophical Studies, 173, 1-19.
18. Fine, K. (2017). “Truthmaker Semantics”, In B. Hale, C. Wright, & A. Miller (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Second ed., pp. 556-577). West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell.
19. Hofweber, T. (2009). “Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics”, in D. Manley, D. J. Chalmers, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 260-289). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20. Jenkins, C. S. (2011). “Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?” The Monist, 94(2), 267-276.
21. Koslicki, K. (2015). “The Coarse-Grainedness of Grounding”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 9, 306-344.
22. Kovacs, D. M. (2018). “What is Wrong with Self-Grounding?” Erkenntnis, 83(6), 1157-1180.
23. Kramer, S. (2013). “A Simpler Puzzle of Ground”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(2), 85-89.
24. Litland, J. E. (2013). “On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding”, Essays in Philosophy, 14(1), 19-32.
25. Litland, J. E. (2015). “Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality”, Philosophical Review, 124(4), 481-532.
26. Litland, J. E. (2016). “An infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound”, Philosophical Studies, 173(5), 1361-1369.
27. Litland, J. E. (2017). “Grounding Ground”, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 10, 279-315.
28. Makin, M. (2017). “Rigid/non-rigid grounding and transitivity”, Inquiry, 1-15.
29. Melnyk, A. (2016). “Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism”, in K. Aizawa & C. Gillett (Eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground (pp. 249-269). London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
30. Ney, A. (2016). “Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: A Defense”, in K. Aizawa & C. Gillett (Eds.), Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground (pp. 271-300). London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
31. Raven, M. J. (2012). “In Defence of Ground”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4), 687-701.
32. Raven, M. J. (2013). “Is Ground a Strict Partial Order?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(2), 193-201.
33. Raven, M. J. (2015). “Ground”, Philosophy Compass, 10(5), 322-333.
34. Rettler, B. (2017). “Grounds and ‘Grounds’”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 47(5), 631-655.
35. Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2015). “Grounding is not a Strict Order”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(03), 517-534. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.22
36. Rosen, G. (2017). “What is a Moral Law?” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 12, 135-159.
37. Schaffer, J. (2010). “Monism: The Priority of the Whole”, Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31-76.
38. Schaffer, J. (2012). “Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity”, in F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (pp. 122-138). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Schaffer, J. (2017a). “The Ground Between the Gaps”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 17(11), 1-26.
40. Schaffer, J. (2017b). “Laws for Metaphysical Explanation”, Philosophical Issues, 27(1), 302-321.
41. Schnieder, B. (2011). “A Logic for ‘Because’”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 4(3), 445-465.
42. Schnieder, B. (2015). “An Asymmetry of ‘Because’”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 91(1), 131-164.
43. Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
44. Skiles, A. (2015). “Against Grounding Necessitarianism”, Erkenntnis, 80(4), 717-751.
45. Tahko, T. E. (2014). “Boring Infinite Descent”, Metaphilosophy, 45(2), 257-269.
46. Tahko, T. E. (2018). “Fundamentality and Ontological Minimality”, in R. Bliss & G. Priest (Eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality (pp. 237-253). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
47. Trogdon, K. (2013). “Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(4), 465-485.
48. Wildman, N. (2018). “On Shaky Ground? Exploring the Contingent Fundamentality Thesis”, in R. Bliss & G. Priest (Eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality (pp. 275-290). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
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1. |
課堂參與 |
40% |
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2. |
報告 |
60% |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
2/18 |
Introduction |
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第2週 |
2/25 |
Guide to Ground (Fine 2012) |
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第3週 |
3/4 |
Truthmaking (Trogdon 2020; Griffith 2014) |
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第4週 |
3/11 |
Dependence (Schnieder 2020a, 2020b) |
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第5週 |
3/18 |
Meta-ground (Litland 2020; deRosset 2013) |
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第6週 |
3/25 |
Modality (Kovacs 2020; Chilovi 2021) |
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第7週 |
4/1 |
Physicalism (Bryant 2020; Dasgupta 2014) |
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第8週 |
4/8 |
Midterm break |
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第9週 |
4/15 |
Emergence (Leuenberger 2020; Barnes 2012) |
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第10週 |
4/22 |
Ontology (Saenz 2020; Schaffer 2015) |
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第11週 |
4/29 |
Laws of nature (Emery 2019; 2020) |
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第12週 |
5/6 |
Social Entities (Passinsky 2020; Schaffer 2019) |
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第13週 |
5/13 |
Cause (Wang 2020; Trogdon 2018) |
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第14週 |
5/20 |
Skeptical Doubts (Koslicki 2020; Wilson 2014) |
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第15週 |
5/27 |
Infinite Descent (Dixon 2020; Dixon 2016) |
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第16週 |
6/3 |
Final presentations |
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