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Course title |
Market Design |
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Semester |
113-1 |
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Designated for |
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS |
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Instructor |
HING CHI JIMMY CHAN |
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Curriculum Number |
ECON3052 |
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Curriculum Identity Number |
303E33500 |
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Class |
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Credits |
3.0 |
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Full/Half
Yr. |
Half |
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Required/
Elective |
Elective |
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Time |
Wednesday 2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
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Remarks |
The upper limit of the number of students: 50. |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
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Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
This course is an introduction to market design, a field of economics focusing on designing markets and mechanisms to allocate resources efficiently. The course covers various topics, including auction theory, matching markets, school choice, and kidney exchange. We will explore the theoretical foundations of market design and examine how market design principles can be applied to real-world problems. |
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Course Objective |
By the end of the course, students should understand the basic principles of market design, have a solid grasp of the theoretical foundations of auction theory and matching markets, analyze real-world problems and design effective market solutions using game-theoretic principles. |
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Course Requirement |
Basic game theory (keywords: (Bayes) Nash equilibrium, dominant strategy) and microeconomics |
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Student Workload (Expected weekly study hours before and/or after class) |
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Office Hours |
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Designated reading |
Haeringer, Guillaume. Market design: auctions and matching. MIT Press, 2018. |
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References |
Alvin Roth. Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. Mariner Books, 2016.
Hubbard, Timothy P., and Harry J. Paarsch. Auctions. MIT Press, 2016. |
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Grading |
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No. |
Item |
% |
Explanations for the conditions |
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1. |
Case study |
20% |
Students must form groups of less than four members to work on a market design problem in real world. Each team is expected to write a report (~3000 words) studying a specific market of their choice, addressing features of the market, evaluation of whether the market is in good shape, suggestions for improvement. Each team is also expected to present their main findings in class. |
2. |
Problem sets |
10% |
There will be four problem sets. See weekly schedules for due dates. |
3. |
Midterm |
35% |
The midterm covers the first half of the course, taught by Junrok Park |
4. |
Final |
35% |
The midterm final covers the second half of the course, taught by Jimmy Chan |
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Week |
Date |
Topic |
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Week 1 |
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(JP) Introduction (Ch 01) and Simple Auctions (Ch 02) |
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Week 2 |
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(JP) Simple Auctions (Ch 02) |
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Week 3 |
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(JP) The Vickery-Clarke-Groves Auction (Ch 04) |
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Week 4 |
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(JP) Keyword Auctions (Ch 05) |
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Week 5 |
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(JP) Spectrum Auctions (Ch 06) |
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Week 6 |
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(JP) Financial Markets (Ch 07) |
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Week 7 |
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Midterm |
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Week 8 |
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(JC) The Basic Matching Model (Ch 09) |
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Week 9 |
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(JC) The Medical Match (Ch 10) |
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Week 10 |
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(JC) Assignment Problems (Ch 11) |
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Week 11 |
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Unversity Anniversary |
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Week 12 |
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(JC) Probabilistic Assignments (Ch 12) |
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Week 13 |
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(JC) School Choice (Ch 13) |
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Week 14 |
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(JC) School Choice: Further Developments (Ch 14) |
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Week 15 |
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Group Presentations |
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Week 16 |
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Final Exam |