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Course title |
Games with Incomplete Information |
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Semester |
110-1 |
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Designated for |
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS |
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Instructor |
BENJAMIN BERNARD |
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Curriculum Number |
ECON7219 |
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Curriculum Identity Number |
323EM1680 |
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Class |
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Credits |
3.0 |
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Full/Half
Yr. |
Half |
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Required/
Elective |
Elective |
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Time |
Monday 6,7,8(13:20~16:20) |
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Remarks |
Restriction: MA students and beyond OR Restriction: Ph. D students
The upper limit of the number of students: 20. |
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Ceiba Web Server |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1101ECON7219_ |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
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Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
From job applications to selling goods or playing poker, there are many situations in which a strategic decision maker has only some, but not all the payoff-relevant information. Uninformed players then maximize their utility according to their beliefs about the unknown quantity. This course provides the tools to describe such incomplete information games and introduces commonly used solution concepts. In addition to the static environment, we study mechanism design, where the principal designs the environment, and dynamic/repeated environments, where players have the ability to learn over time.
We will be using NTU Cool: https://cool.ntu.edu.tw/courses/7332 |
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Course Objective |
Week 1: Knowledge and Learning
Week 2: Beliefs and Belief Hierarchies
Week 3: Bayesian Games
Week 4: Signaling and Cheap Talk
Week 5: Information Design
Weeks 6-8: Mechanism Design
Week 9: Midterm Exam
Week 10: Social Learning
Week 11-12: Repeated Games and Reputations
Week 13: Dynamic Mechanism Design
Weeks 14-16: Student Presentations |
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Course Requirement |
Requirements for students after the class: Students will be able to recognize and model situations with incomplete information and use the right tools/solution concepts to solve them. |
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Student Workload (expected study time outside of class per week) |
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Office Hours |
Wed. 15:00~16:20
Mon. 18:30~19:30 Note: Or by appointment |
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Designated reading |
No required readings; see References for suggested readings. |
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References |
♦ "Game Theory, an Introduction", 1st edition, 2013, by Steven Tadelis, Princeton
University Press
♦ "Game Theory", 1st edition, 2013, by Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan, and Shumel Zamir,
Cambridge University Press
♦ "An Introduction to Modern Mechanism Design", 1st edition, 2015, by Tilman Börgers,
Oxford University Press
♦ "Repeated Games and Reputations", 1st edition, 2006, by George J. Mailath and Larry
Samuelson, Oxford University Press
♦ "Game Theory", 1st edition, 1991, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press |
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Grading |
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No. |
Item |
% |
Explanations for the conditions |
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1. |
Participation |
10% |
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2. |
Student presentation |
40% |
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3. |
Midterm exam |
30% |
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4. |
Assignments |
20% |
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