課程資訊
課程名稱
進階公司理財
Advanced Corporate Finance 
開課學期
106-1 
授課對象
社會科學院  經濟學研究所  
授課教師
吳儀玲 
課號
ECON7051 
課程識別碼
323 M7170 
班次
 
學分
2.0 
全/半年
半年 
必/選修
選修 
上課時間
星期一3,4(10:20~12:10) 
上課地點
社科研609 
備註
限碩士班以上
總人數上限:20人 
Ceiba 課程網頁
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1061ECON7051_ 
課程簡介影片
 
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課程概述

This is an advanced course in corporate finance. Its goal is to bring Ph.D. students to the frontier of knowledge so that they can start doing their own research in this field.

The course will cover seven topics, each of which will take about two sessions. The goal will be to combine theory and empirical work, and to bring students to the state of the art in that subfield, so that they potentially begin to do research in that area.

 

課程目標
待補 
課程要求
There will be a referee report due on an article that I will hand out in class. Write the report as a reviewer for potential publication in a major academic finance journal, up to three well-spaced pages. Part 1 of each report should succinctly state each of the paper’s important contributions in the best possible light. Part 2 should constructively critique any shortcomings. Part 3 should make suggestions for improvements. This report should be accompanied with a short letter to the editor (me), recommending that I reject the paper, request a revision, or accept the paper, and why. The report will count for 20% of the grade. 
預期每週課後學習時數
 
Office Hours
 
參考書目
A. The Entrenchment Problem

Demsetz, H. (1983) "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics.

Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1989) "Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Firm-Specific Assets," Journal of Financial Economics.

* Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1988) "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Financial Economics.

Holderness, C., R. Kroszner, and D. Sheehan (1999) “Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression,” Journal of Finance, 54, 435-469.


B. Incentive Contracts and Other Direct Incentives

* Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (1990) "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-264.

* Hall, B. and J. Liebman (1998) “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 653-691.

Haubrich, J. (1994) "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy.

Hall, B. and K. Murphy (2003) “The Trouble with Stock Options,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, (Number 3), 49-70.

Bebchuk, L, and J. Fried (2003) “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, (Number 3), 71-92.

Kaplan, Steven and Joshua Rauh (2010) “Wall Street and Main Street: What contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes,” Review of Financial Studies.


C. Boards of Directors

* Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (1998) “Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of Management”, American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (March, 1998), pp. 96-118.

* Weisbach, M. (1988) "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431-460.

Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (2003) “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously-Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Evidence,” Economic Policy Review, 9, Number 1.

Adams, R., B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, (2010) “Boards of Directors and their Role in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey”, Journal of Economic Literature, 48, 58-107.
Shivdasani, A. and David Yermack (1999) “CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance, 54, pp. 1829-1854.

D. Management Turnover

Bertrand, M. and A. Schoar (2003) “Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1169-1208.

Pan, Yihui, Tracy Wang, and M. Weisbach (2013) “Learning About CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility,” Working Paper.

Pan, Yihui, Tracy Wang, and M. Weisbach (2013) “CEO Investment Cycles,” Working Paper.
E. Proxy Voting and Institutional Activism

* Zingales, L. (1995) “What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1047-1073.

Zingales, L. (1994) "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange," Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125-148.

* Del Guercio, D. and J. Hawkins (1999) “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism,” Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 293-340.

Carleton, W., J. Nelson, and M. Weisbach (1998) “The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF” The Journal of Finance, 53, pp. 1335-1362.

Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and R. Thomas (2008) “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63. pp. 1729-1775.

F. Employee Pension Funds
 
指定閱讀
待補 
評量方式
(僅供參考)
   
課程進度
週次
日期
單元主題
第0週
  Syllabus and Preparing a Referee Report: Guidelines and Perspectives 
第1週
  Topic 1: CEOS 
第2週
9/18  Topic 4: Executive Networks and Firm Policies 
第4週
10/02  Topic 5: CEO Pay & Inside Debt 
第7週
9/25  Topic 7: Supplier-Customer Networks 
第7週
10/16  Topic 6: Clawbacks & Severance Agreements 
第8週
10/30  Topic 8: Innovation  
第9週
11/06  Topic 9: Litigation  
第10週
11/13  Best paper in 2017 FMA Annual Meeting Program 
第11週
11/20  Voting in Mergers and Acquisitions 
第12週
11/27  New measures of vega 
第15週
12/18  Referee reports_2018 
第16週
12/25  Presentation paper 2018 
第1-2週
9/11  Topic 2: Executive Compensation & Firm Risk Taking 
第1-3週
  Topic 3: Executive Compensation & Say-on-Pay