Course title |
Experimental Economics I: Behavioral Game Theory |
Semester |
111-2 |
Designated for |
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS |
Instructor |
JOSEPH TAO-YI WANG |
Curriculum Number |
ECON5112 |
Curriculum Identity Number |
323EU8110 |
Class |
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Credits |
3.0 |
Full/Half Yr. |
Half |
Required/ Elective |
Elective |
Time |
Tuesday 2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
Remarks |
Restriction: juniors and beyond OR Restriction: MA students and beyond OR Restriction: Ph. D students The upper limit of the number of students: 32. The upper limit of the number of non-majors: 4. |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
[For details, see: http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/experimental_23S.htm]
This is an upper division and graduate level course on experimental economics, focusing on behavioral game theory. The purpose is to introduce experimental economics to students so they can start their own research in this field. You are expected to write individual research proposals and present them. |
Course Objective |
Specific goals of this course include:
1. Introduction to experimental economics: After this class, students are expected to be able to name several experiments performed in each fields of economics, and describe how the results affirm (or differ from) economic theory and/or field data.
2. Experimental design: After this class, students are expected to understand how to design and run an experiment. Students will also write a research proposal that:
a. Proposes an economic experiment (with sample subject instructions), satisfying:
i. Real Incentives (so choices have real consequences),
ii. A Good Control Group (to compare with Treatment group),
iii.Random Assignment (to the Treatment and Control groups),
iv.No deception (to establish reputation so real incentives are believed).
b. Argues why should we care about this experiment and why the experiment is designed this way (compared to other possible designs), and,
c. Relates your experiment to existing literature (if any) and describes expected results and/or methods to analyze the data (or simulation results).
3. Evaluate most current research: After this class, students are expected to develop the ability to read recent journal articles in experimental economics, and evaluate the quality of the papers. During class, students are expected to read assigned journal articles and book chapters and present one article and/or one chapter in class. |
Course Requirement |
Intermediate Miroeconomics II and/or Game Theory. |
Student Workload (expected study time outside of class per week) |
6 |
Office Hours |
Fri. 17:20~18:00 Note: After class (at the classroom), or by email appointment. |
References |
Other Recommended Reading:
1. Capra, Croson, Rigdon and Rosenblat ed. (2020), Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing.
2. Kagel and Roth, ed. (1995/2016), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 1 and Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press (HEE1/2).
3. Holt (2019), Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. (Holt; Undergraduate text)
4. Moffatt (2016), Experimetrics: Econometrics for Experimental Economics, Palgrave. |
Designated reading |
Textbook: BGT - Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
Presentation: Arely and Kreisler (2017), Dollars and Sense, HarperCollins. (D&S) |
Grading |
No. |
Item |
% |
Explanations for the conditions |
1. |
Weekly Homework |
15% |
Weekly problem sets submitted on NTU COOL. |
2. |
Replication |
15% |
Form groups to replicate estimation of assigned paper (due 4/14). |
3. |
Presentation |
30% |
20-minute oral presentation of one book chapter and one research article (10% each) and feedback to others presenters (10%). |
4. |
Final Proposal |
40% |
Final presentation and written proposal (<4 pages, due 6/9) |
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Adjustment methods for students |
Teaching methods |
Assisted by video |
Assignment submission methods |
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Exam methods |
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Others |
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Week |
Date |
Topic |
Week 1 |
2/24 |
Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1) |
Week 2 |
3/3 |
Risk and Time Preferences (Holt, Ch.3; Liu-2014)
Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2) |
Week 3 |
3/10 |
Social Preferences (part 1) (BGT, Ch.2; HEE2, Ch.4; Lin-2020) [DS-0] |
Week 4 |
3/17 |
Social Preferences (part 2) (BGT, Ch.2; HEE2, Ch.4; Lin-2020) [DS-1] |
Week 5 |
3/24 |
Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (BGT, Ch.3; QRE chapter) [DS-2] |
Week 6 |
3/31 |
Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4; Chen-2021) [DS-3] |
Week 7 |
4/7 |
Dominant Solvable Games (BGT, Ch.5) [DS-4] |
Week 8 |
4/14 |
Midterm Proposal Presentation and Replication Exercise Due |
Week 9 |
4/21 |
Level-k Thinking (Crawford-2013; Wang-2010) [DS-5] |
Week 10 |
4/28 |
Learning (BGT, Ch.6; HEE2, Ch.10; Knoepfle-2009; Chen-2020) [DS-6] |
Week 11 |
5/5 |
Coordination (BGT, Ch.7) [DS-7] |
Week 12 |
5/12 |
Signaling and Reputation (BGT, Ch.8) [DS-8] |
Week 13 |
5/19 |
Market Design (Jackson-2013; HEE2, Ch.5) [DS-9] |
Week 14 |
5/26 |
Auctions (EL, Ch.9; HEE2, Ch.9)
Field Experiments (Harrison-List-2004; Glennerster-Takavarasha) [DS-10] |
Week 15 |
6/2 |
Neuroeconomics (HEE2, Ch.3; Krajbich-2014; Chen-Wang-2019)
Experimetrics (Moffatt-MiniCourse)
(Optional) Political Economy (HEE2, Ch.6); Open vs. Closed (BLLW-19) |
Week 16 |
6/9 |
Final Proposal Presentation and Proposal Due |
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