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Course title |
Experimental Economics I: Behavioral Game Theory |
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Semester |
112-2 |
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Designated for |
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS |
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Instructor |
JOSEPH TAO-YI WANG |
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Curriculum Number |
ECON5112 |
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Curriculum Identity Number |
323EU8110 |
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Class |
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Credits |
3.0 |
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Full/Half Yr. |
Half |
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Required/ Elective |
Elective |
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Time |
Tuesday 2,3,4(9:10~12:10) |
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Remarks |
Restriction: juniors and beyond OR Restriction: MA students and beyond OR Restriction: Ph. D students The upper limit of the number of students: 32. The upper limit of the number of non-majors: 4. |
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Course introduction video |
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Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
Table of Core Capabilities and Curriculum Planning |
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Course Syllabus
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Please respect the intellectual property rights of others and do not copy any of the course information without permission
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Course Description |
This is an upper division and graduate level course on experimental economics, focusing on behavioral game theory. The purpose is to introduce experimental economics to students so they can start their own research in this field. You are expected to write replication reports of research papers and present them. |
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Course Objective |
Specific goals of this course include:
1. Introduction to Experimental Economics: After this class, students are expected to be able to name several experiments performed in each fields of economics, and describe how the results affirm (or differ from) economic theory and/or field data.
2. Experimental Design: After this class, students are expected to understand how to design and run an experiment. Students can also write a research proposal that:
a. Proposes an economic experiment (with sample subject instructions), satisfying:
i. Real Incentives (so choices have real consequences),
ii. A Good Control Group (to compare with Treatment group),
iii. Random Assignment (to the Treatment and Control groups),
iv. No deception (to establish reputation so real incentives are believed).
b. Argues why should we care about this experiment and why the experiment is designed this way (compared to other possible designs), and,
c. Relates your experiment to existing literature (if any) and describes expected results and/or methods to analyze the data (or simulation results).
3. Evaluate Current Research: After this class, students are expected to develop the ability to read recent journal articles in experimental economics, and evaluate the quality of the papers. During class, students are expected to read assigned journal articles and book chapters and present one article in class. |
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Course Requirement |
Intermediate microeconomics or game theory is the pre-requisite of this course. |
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Student Workload (Expected weekly study hours before and/or after class) |
6 |
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Office Hours |
Tue. 12:10~13:00 Note: Or by email appointment. |
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Designated reading |
1. Camerer (2003), Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton University Press. (BGT)
2. Moffatt (2019), Experimetrics Lecture Notes for NTU mini-course. (EMT) |
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References |
1. Capra, Croson, Rigdon and Rosenblat, ed. (2020), Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing.
2. Kagel and Roth, ed. (1995/2016), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 1 and Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press (HEE1/2).
3. Holt (2019), Markets, Games and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction to Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. (Holt; Undergraduate text)
4. Moffatt (2016), Experimetrics: Econometrics for Experimental Economics, Palgrave. |
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Grading |
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No. |
Item |
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Explanations for the conditions |
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1. |
Homework and Quiz |
40% |
Final quiz on weekly problem sets in BGT (5/28 in class). |
2. |
Estimation and Replication |
35% |
Form groups to perform experimetric estimations (submit via NTU COOL) and replicate assigned paper (due 6/4). |
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Presentation |
25% |
20-minute oral presentation of one research article (15%) and feedback to others (10%).
In lieu of oral presentation (15%) and replication report (20%), one may present and submit an experimental proposal (35%; <4 pages, due 6/4). |
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Adjustment methods for students |
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Teaching methods |
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Assignment submission methods |
Written report replaces oral report |
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Exam methods |
Written (oral) reports replace exams |
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Others |
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Week |
Date |
Topic |
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Week 1 |
2/20 |
Experimental Economics and Behavioral Game Theory (BGT, Ch.1; Holt; Wang)
Experimetrics and Power Analysis (EMT, Ch.1-2) |
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Week 2 |
2/27 |
Risk and Time Preferences (Holt, Ch.3)
Basic Principles of Experimental Design (BGT, A1.2)
Estimation of Risk Aversion Parameter: Binary Lottery (EMT, Ch.3) |
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Week 3 |
3/5 |
Social Preferences (BGT, Ch.2; HEE2, Ch.4; UG, DG, Trust; Lin-20)
Estimating Social Preferences/Ultimatum Game (EMT, Ch. 4) |
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Week 4 |
3/12 |
Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium (BGT, Ch.3); Estimating QRE (Experimetrics, Ch.16) |
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Week 5 |
3/19 |
Bargaining (BGT, Ch.4) |
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Week 6 |
3/26 |
Dominant Solvable Games (BGT, Ch.5) |
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Week 7 |
4/2 |
Multi-Agent Contracting (Guest Lecture by Eyal Winter)
Mini-Course in Multi-Agent Contracting (by Eyal Winter) [4/2-11] |
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Week 8 |
4/9 |
Experimental Evidence of Multi-Agent Contracting (Guest Lecture: Eyal Winter) |
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Week 9 |
4/16 |
Level-k Thinking (Crawford-13); Finite Mixture Models (EMT, Ch. 5) |
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Week 10 |
4/23 |
Learning (BGT, Ch.6; HEE2, Ch.10) |
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Week 11 |
4/30 |
Coordination (BGT, Ch.7) |
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Week 12 |
5/7 |
Signaling/Reputation (BGT, Ch.8) |
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Week 13 |
5/14 |
Research Paper Presentation |
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Week 14 |
5/21 |
Replication Report Presentation |
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Week 15 |
5/28 |
Final Quiz |
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Week 16 |
6/4 |
Revised Replication Presentation and Replication Report Due |
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