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課程名稱 |
個體經濟理論一
Microeconomic Theory (Ⅰ) |
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開課學期 |
102-1 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
王道一 |
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課號 |
ECON7011 |
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課程識別碼 |
323EM0610 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
4 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
必修 |
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上課時間 |
星期三6,7(13:20~15:10)星期五6,7,8(13:20~16:20) |
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上課地點 |
社科7社科7 |
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備註 |
本課程以英語授課。王道一老師教授第一部分；馮勃翰老師教授第二部份。與馮勃翰合開
限博士班 或 限碩士班以上
總人數上限：90人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1021graduate_micro1 |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
This is the first graduate core course for Microeconomic Theory. The first half of the course covers Optimization, Consumer Decision and Uncertainty. The second half of the course covers Basic Game Theory. While learning formal models and mathematical techniques, this course also help you understand how to think like an economists.
For the first half of the course, please refer to the instructor's course website:
http://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~josephw/essential_micro_theory_13F.htm |
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課程目標 |
1. Grasp the basic tools of microeconomic theory.
2. Develop the ability to understand modern economic theory.
3. Think like an economist. |
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課程要求 |
This is a graduate core course of Microeconomic Theory, so you are assumed to know everything about intermediate microeconomics. In addition, this course employs mathematical reasoning, so you should know at least Calculus A(I, II), if not Advanced Calculus (I) (aka undergraduate real analysis).
Part I requirement: This half is taught solely in English, and you have to finish all assignments in English. Professor Wang pre-commits NOT to understand Chinese either in class or when grading. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
Riley (2012), Essential Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press. (EM)
Gibbons (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press. |
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參考書目 |
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford UP, 1995. (MWG) |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
9/11,9/13 |
Supporting Prices (EM 1.1), Shadow Prices (EM 1.2) and [TA] Monopoly Pricing with Joint Costs (EM 1.5) |
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第2週 |
9/18,9/20 |
Envelope Theorem (EM 1.3) and Theory of Choice (EM 2.1) |
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第3週 |
9/25,9/27 |
Budget Constrained Consumer Choice with 2 Commodities (EM 2.2), Budget Constrained Consumer Choice with n Commodities (EM 2.3) |
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第4週 |
10/02,10/04 |
(Optional) Advanced Topics in Consumer Theory (EM 2.4-2.5), The 2x2 Exchange Economy (EM 3.1) |
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第5週 |
10/09,10/11 |
The Fundamental Welfare Theorems (EM 3.2), Theory of Risky Choice (EM 7.1) |
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第6週 |
10/16,10/18 |
Attitude toward Risk (EM 7.2), Comparing Risky Alternatives (EM 7.3) |
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第7週 |
10/23,10/25 |
Principal-Agent Problem (EM 7.4), Quiz and TA session |
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第8週 |
10/30,11/01 |
More Principal-Agent Problems: Hidden Information vs. Hidden Action (MWG), Edgeworth Box Bargaining Experiments (Sunder) |
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第9週 |
11/06,11/08 |
Risk Preference Experiments (Andreoni and Sprenger, AER, 2012), Written Midterm Exam |
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第10週 |
11/13,11/15 |
Normal-form Games; Dominance; Beliefs and Best Response; Nash Equilibrium |
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第11週 |
11/20,11/22 |
Dominance and Rationalizability; Winbledon; Mixed Strategies; All-pay Auctions; Pricing on the Internet; TA session |
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第12週 |
11/27,11/29 |
TA session; Problem Set #1; Cournot with Private Costs; Bayesian Games; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
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第13週 |
12/04,12/06 |
TA session; Auctions; Purification of Mixed Strategies |
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第14週 |
12/11,12/13 |
TA session; Problem Set #2; Winner’s Curse; Extensive-form Games; Subgame Perfection; Credibility |
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第15週 |
12/18,12/20 |
TA session; Sequential Bargaining; Inefficient Redistribution; Commitment Problem |
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第16週 |
12/25,12/27 |
TA session; Problem Set #3; The Sender-Receiver Game; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Refinements |
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第17週 |
1/01,1/03 |
TA session; Job Market Signaling; Screening; Signaling and Cheap Talk |
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